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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PARO LE 
A-DMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 





Appearances: Thomas Kaczkowski, Esq. 
P.O. Box 203 
Wurtsboro, New York 12790 
05-098-19 B 
Decision appealed: May 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of24 months. 
Board Member(s) Cruse, Alexander 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived November 13, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Final Determination: The. undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~~~rmed . _ Vacated, remanded.for de novo interview _ Modified to---,-----
' Co . 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to _ _ _ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reason~ for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit'~ Findings and the sepatate findings o 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ·~ IJ5 J.oJ.o 
Distribution: App-eaJs Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1 1/2018) 
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Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life upon her conviction of Murder in the second 
degree and Robbery in the third degree.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the May 2019 
determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold on the following 
grounds: (1) the Board improperly focused on the instant offense without citing any aggravating 
factors or properly considering other factors such as Appellant’s rehabilitative efforts and 
accomplishments, release plans and the “guideline time range”; (2) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious and violates due process because the Board placed more weight on the instant offense 
than other factors; (3) the decision fails to provide adequate details; and (4) the 24-month hold is 
excessive.  These arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  Appellant’s reliance on the guideline 
ranges is misplaced inasmuch as the relevant provision was repealed. 
 
In 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4). 
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 
N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board 
must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
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990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros, 
139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834.  In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board 
did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter 
of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); 
Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 
(3d Dept. 1990). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses wherein Appellant’s co-defendant, who she 
engaged to commit a robbery, shot the victim in the face while Appellant waited outside and 
separately Appellant stole merchandise from a store; Appellant’s criminal history including two 
prior State terms and that Appellant was on parole when she committed the instant offenses; her 
institutional record including completion of ART and discipline with two new Tier III infractions 
since her last Board; Appellant’s history of substance abuse ; and release plans 
to reside with her aunt or live in a shelter, work with the  and pursue 
work with youth.  The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s 
case plan and the COMPAS instrument.  
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses, that they represent 
Appellant’s third State term and she committed the offenses while on parole, the COMPAS 
instrument’s elevated scores for arrest and abscond risk and reentry substance abuse, Appellant’s 
institutional behavior including the new Tier III infractions, issues combined with a 
substance abuse history, and limited insight into the gravity of her behavior.  See Executive Law §§ 
259-i(2)(c)(A), 259-c(4); Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter of 
Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Thompson 
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v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 
2014); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 
132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Dudley v. 
Travis, 227 A.D.2d 863, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 812, 649 N.Y.S.2d 
379 (1996); Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994).  The 
Board encouraged Appellant to work on her insight, strengthen her release plan, continue to develop 
family ties and remain discipline free.  See Executive Law §§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), 259-c(4).  While the 
Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always required to support emphasis on an 
inmate’s offense, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the Board’s decision 
here was based on additional considerations. 
 
Furthermore, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole 
before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 
69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the 
denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).  
The Board addressed several factors and principles considered in individualized terms and 
explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations. 
 
Finally, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is 
within the Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
